The key point, here I think, which you mentioned is the fact that there is an irreducible abyss between qualitative experience and quantitative measurements of brain processes.
Yes, and next week in Part 2 I will offer a further example that I think drives this point home even further.
But I would also say (and I don't think I emphasized this above) that there is a fundamentally asymmetrical relationship between the qualitative and the quantitative, since our comprehension of quantitative models is something that we apprehend *through* our qualitative experience. Reality always presents itself to us (or, at least, it always does for me—I can't quite be sure how it presents to anyone else, as I will discuss in part 2) qualitatively. Quantitative measurement and modelling are things that are done *within* my phenomenal consciousness, and so oddly are always founded on the qualitative.
But the reverse is not true, at least not phenomenologically—though, of course, a materialist would want to argue that the reverse is actually true, even though it doesn't seem that way. To date, I've never actually seen an argument (whether eliminativst, epiphenomenanlist, or "constitutive") demonstrate how this is supposed to work, though.
For me, this asymmetry, the way in which any quantitative model of existence has to rely on the very qualitative "stage" that it wants to disprove is a very important, yet very often completely overlooked, feature of reality—or, again, at least how reality presents itself to us.
I'm not sure I follow when you say that "However there are also objects that can be constructed to correspond to colour, i.e. predict the detection of red, green, etc." I don't see how any version of physics could somehow generate an understanding of the qualitative experience of color—and indeed, later on, you clarify that this isn't exactly what you mean, anyway. Could you give more detail on this? And/or do you have any suggested reading on this subject (for a non-physicist?) My concern is that there is an elision between two different kinds of claims here—but it might just be that I don't have the right tools to analyze the claim.
As for your comment on oxygen having qualities that are not reducible to its constituent parts—this relates to a long-standing debate in philosophy, and there is as whole school of "non-reductive physicalists" (e.g. Nancey Murphy). I have to say that, in what I've read so far, I have not found this argument convincing. But, again, I'd be happy to read anything you suggest on this topic.
So this is very interesting, especially as my understanding of contemporary physics was that quantum effects are understood as "micro" effects, only having explanatory relevance at the level below the atomic (proton/neutron), but having no relevance at a "higher" level. So e.g. many publically-facing physicists have insisted that the probabilistic nature of quantum fields had no meaningful bearing on larger entities, that at the level of thr chemical and higher, physics is effectively deterministic. But if I'm understanding you, you seem to be insisting that this is isn't exactly right, that there are quantum effects which are "visible" at higher levels of analysis. Or have I misunderstood? This topic is definitely above my paygrade!
The key point, here I think, which you mentioned is the fact that there is an irreducible abyss between qualitative experience and quantitative measurements of brain processes.
Yes, and next week in Part 2 I will offer a further example that I think drives this point home even further.
But I would also say (and I don't think I emphasized this above) that there is a fundamentally asymmetrical relationship between the qualitative and the quantitative, since our comprehension of quantitative models is something that we apprehend *through* our qualitative experience. Reality always presents itself to us (or, at least, it always does for me—I can't quite be sure how it presents to anyone else, as I will discuss in part 2) qualitatively. Quantitative measurement and modelling are things that are done *within* my phenomenal consciousness, and so oddly are always founded on the qualitative.
But the reverse is not true, at least not phenomenologically—though, of course, a materialist would want to argue that the reverse is actually true, even though it doesn't seem that way. To date, I've never actually seen an argument (whether eliminativst, epiphenomenanlist, or "constitutive") demonstrate how this is supposed to work, though.
For me, this asymmetry, the way in which any quantitative model of existence has to rely on the very qualitative "stage" that it wants to disprove is a very important, yet very often completely overlooked, feature of reality—or, again, at least how reality presents itself to us.
Could you say more, especially about how you see physics interacting with or describing the qualitative?
I'm not sure I follow when you say that "However there are also objects that can be constructed to correspond to colour, i.e. predict the detection of red, green, etc." I don't see how any version of physics could somehow generate an understanding of the qualitative experience of color—and indeed, later on, you clarify that this isn't exactly what you mean, anyway. Could you give more detail on this? And/or do you have any suggested reading on this subject (for a non-physicist?) My concern is that there is an elision between two different kinds of claims here—but it might just be that I don't have the right tools to analyze the claim.
As for your comment on oxygen having qualities that are not reducible to its constituent parts—this relates to a long-standing debate in philosophy, and there is as whole school of "non-reductive physicalists" (e.g. Nancey Murphy). I have to say that, in what I've read so far, I have not found this argument convincing. But, again, I'd be happy to read anything you suggest on this topic.
So this is very interesting, especially as my understanding of contemporary physics was that quantum effects are understood as "micro" effects, only having explanatory relevance at the level below the atomic (proton/neutron), but having no relevance at a "higher" level. So e.g. many publically-facing physicists have insisted that the probabilistic nature of quantum fields had no meaningful bearing on larger entities, that at the level of thr chemical and higher, physics is effectively deterministic. But if I'm understanding you, you seem to be insisting that this is isn't exactly right, that there are quantum effects which are "visible" at higher levels of analysis. Or have I misunderstood? This topic is definitely above my paygrade!