I tend to view early modernity—represented by thinkers like Descartes, Hume, Spinoza, and Leibniz—as grappling with the problem of grounding knowledge in the mind of the subject for the first time. This shift led to an effort to rewrite fundamental metaphysics in a way that could supersede classical metaphysics. With Descartes, for example, we see a rejection of formal and final causes and an explicit attempt to ground the existence of God and the certainty of knowledge within the subject. His famous dictum, Cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"), directly contrasts with the earlier tradition of thinkers like Aquinas, who might say, "I am, therefore I think."
The defining feature of modernity is that the grounding of reality no longer rests in God but in the mind of man. More importantly, modernity seems to be the first philosophical movement that attempts to construct metaphysics not as a continuation or development of tradition but in opposition to it. This "writing against" history often comes with an enormous investment in the power of a single individual to overturn and rewrite what took centuries of collective thought to develop.
This hubris—the belief that one person can accomplish what tradition achieved over generations—ultimately led to disillusionment. The supposed progress of modernity was starkly undermined by the horrors of the 20th century, leading to yet another revolt against the past. A revolt against a revolt: e.g. post-modernism.
I agree, and I think some of the themes you develop here will come more to the fore in part 2. My hope is to show how (a certain type) of postmodern thought can lead us out of the errors of modern thought (while retaining its genuine contributions) and help re-establish a sense of our need for something other/beyond us not only spiritually, but metaphysically as well.
Wait a minute, I thought postmodernism came from the "postmodern condition" essay! And isn't postmodernism an incredulity towards metanarratives, not an incredulity towards phenomena?
The argument I begin to present above is that postmodernism comes from an incredulity towards noumena, not phenomena (though I will have more to say on that next week). Lyotard does seem to have been the first to introduce the use of "postmodern" in philosophy—but I am interested here not in the term itself, but what it represents. The deeper currents of thought arose generations before Lyotard himself.
I tend to view early modernity—represented by thinkers like Descartes, Hume, Spinoza, and Leibniz—as grappling with the problem of grounding knowledge in the mind of the subject for the first time. This shift led to an effort to rewrite fundamental metaphysics in a way that could supersede classical metaphysics. With Descartes, for example, we see a rejection of formal and final causes and an explicit attempt to ground the existence of God and the certainty of knowledge within the subject. His famous dictum, Cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"), directly contrasts with the earlier tradition of thinkers like Aquinas, who might say, "I am, therefore I think."
The defining feature of modernity is that the grounding of reality no longer rests in God but in the mind of man. More importantly, modernity seems to be the first philosophical movement that attempts to construct metaphysics not as a continuation or development of tradition but in opposition to it. This "writing against" history often comes with an enormous investment in the power of a single individual to overturn and rewrite what took centuries of collective thought to develop.
This hubris—the belief that one person can accomplish what tradition achieved over generations—ultimately led to disillusionment. The supposed progress of modernity was starkly undermined by the horrors of the 20th century, leading to yet another revolt against the past. A revolt against a revolt: e.g. post-modernism.
I agree, and I think some of the themes you develop here will come more to the fore in part 2. My hope is to show how (a certain type) of postmodern thought can lead us out of the errors of modern thought (while retaining its genuine contributions) and help re-establish a sense of our need for something other/beyond us not only spiritually, but metaphysically as well.
Wait a minute, I thought postmodernism came from the "postmodern condition" essay! And isn't postmodernism an incredulity towards metanarratives, not an incredulity towards phenomena?
The argument I begin to present above is that postmodernism comes from an incredulity towards noumena, not phenomena (though I will have more to say on that next week). Lyotard does seem to have been the first to introduce the use of "postmodern" in philosophy—but I am interested here not in the term itself, but what it represents. The deeper currents of thought arose generations before Lyotard himself.